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European Implications of Bankruptcy Venu-e 
Shopping in the U.S. 
DAVID A. SKEEL, JR.t 
INTRODUCTION 
For decades,  the U.S .  debate over states' efforts to 
attract corporations-and over Delaware's success in that 
endeavor-was mostly a sideshow for European companies 
and scholars.  To be sure, there have long been worries that 
charter competition might emerge in the European Union 
and generate a regulatory "race to the bottom."l But the 
"real seat" doctrine, which assured that the country where a 
corporation's principal operations are located would supply 
its corporate law, was strongly entrenched. Whereas U.8. 
companies that would prefer a different regulatory 
framework need only reincorporate in the jurisdiction they 
wish to be governed by, European companies were stuck 
with the laws of the country where most of their operations 
were located .  As a result , European companies did not have 
a dog in the U .S .  skirmishes over charter competition in 
corporate law and venue shopping in corporate 
bankruptcy .2 
t S. Samuel Arsht Professor of Corporate Law, University of Pennsylvania. 
Thanks to Bill Whitford for setting up this symposium, and to Horst 
Eidenmuller, Luca Enriques, and Lynn LoPucki for helpful comments on an 
earlier draft. Although I reach very different conclusions than LoPucki about 
the significance of bankruptcy venue shopping, I am a great admirer of his 
work, and a longtime beneficiary of his insights, his Bankruptcy Research 
Database, and his friendship. 
1. Concerns about charter competition were one impetus for longstanding 
efforts to promote harmonization of EU members' corporate laws. See, e.g., 
VANESSA EDWARDS, EC COMPANY LAW 3 (1999). 
2. The well-spring of the recent corporate charter debate was William L. 
Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YA.LE L.J. 
663 (1974) , which castigated Delaware as a "pigmy state" and called for 
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Suddenly, everything has changed. Starting with the 
Centros case in 1999, ED courts have issued a series of 
decisions suggesting that. a company's corporate laws will 
be determined by its domicile , even if most or all of the 
company's assets and operations are located elsewhere.3 
This means that a French or German company can 
incorporate in England to take advantage of English 
corporate law, much as roughly half of the Fortune 500 
companies incorporate in Delaware to assure access to 
Delaware law and the privileges of Delaware 
incorporation.4 The ED does not invite the same kind of 
forum shopping in the insolvency context. But a recent ED 
Insolvency Regulation that requires insolvency proceedings 
to be held in a company's "centre of main interests"-or 
COMI-is seen as sufficiently "fuzzy" to allow at least 
limited forum shopping when a company encounters 
financial distress.  
Thanks to these developments , regulatory competition· 
is now more of a reality in the ED than ever before . 
Increasingly, European scholars are glancing across the 
increased federalization of corporate law. Professor LoPucki and his co- author 
Bill Whitford were the first to shine a light on venue shopping in corporate 
reorganization cases .  See Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Venue 
Choice and Forum Shopping in the Bankruptcy Reorganization of Large, 
Publicly Held Companies, 1991 WIS. L. REV. 1l. Both debates have historical 
antecedents that go back even further. See, e.g., David A. Skeel, Jr., Bankruptcy 
Judges and Bankruptcy Venue: Some Thoughts on Delaware, 1 DEL. L. REV. 1, 
8-11 (1998) (describing New Deal debates over Delaware's prominence as a 
court of choice for reorganization cases). 
3. Case C-212/97, Centros Ltd v. Erhvervs- og Selskabsstyrelsen, (Mar. 9. 
1999) (Den.), http://europa. eu.int/eur-lexllexiLexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri= 
CELEX:61997J0212:EN:HTML. The central holding of Centros was reaffirmed 
in the subsequent Uberseering and Inspire Art decisions. See Case C-208/00, 
Uberseering BV v. Nordic Construction Company Baumanagement GmbH 
(NCC) (Nov. 9, 2002) (F.R.G.), http://europa.eu.intieur-lexllexiLexUriServ/ 
LexUriServ. do?uri=CELEX:62000J0208:EN:HTML� Case C-167/01, Kamer van 
Koophandel en Fabrieken voor Amsterdam v. Inspire Art Ltd. (Sep. 30, 2003) 
(Neth.), http://europa.eu.intieurlexllexiLexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri-C ELEX: 
62001J0167:EN:HTML. 
4. European companies currently have much more flexibility to choose their 
domicile at the formation stage than midstream, due to tax and other barriers 
that impede reincorporation. For a persuasive argument that many of these 
barriers are likely to fall in the near future, see John Armour, Who Should 
Make Corporate Law? EU Legislation versus Regulatory Competition (ESRC 
Ctr. for Bus. Research, Univ. of Cambridge, Working Paper No. 307, 2005), 
available at http://www.cbr. cam.ac.uk/pdf/WP307.pdf. 
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Atlantic to see what can be gleaned from the longstanding 
American debates on these questions . What does the 
American evidence tell us? 
When it comes to the bankruptcy side of the equation­
and in particular, Delaware's status as the venue of choice 
for large corporate bankruptcies in the 1990s-Lynn 
LoPucki offers a simple ,  decisive answer in Courting 
Failure.5 Not to put too fine a point on it, LoPucki insists­
"shouts" might be a better word-that venue shopping in 
U.S .  bankruptcy cases is a plague that spreads the disease 
of corruption wherever it goes. The Delaware bankruptcy 
judges attracted many of the largest corporate 
reorganization cases in the 1990s by allowing failed 
managers to remain in charge and inviting their 
bankruptcy lawyers to line their own pockets in order to 
entice the managers and lawyers to bring the cases in 
Delaware. The process that emerged, LoPucki contends, 
was rotten to the core .6 Since then,  he argues, other 
bankruptcy courts have adopted the same corrupt practices, 
hoping to attract some of the large cases for themselves.  
LoPucki believes that this corruption has now crossed the 
Atlantic and is infecting Europe.? The new EU Insolvency 
Regulation, together with a general move toward 
"universalism" in international insolvency cases, has 
unleashed in Europe the same plague that has ravished the 
U.S .  system.s The only response, he contends, is a 
quarantine that requires that a separate, primary 
insolvency proceeding be brought in each country where a 
company's assets or operations are located.9 This response, 
5. LYNN M.  LOPUCKI, COURTING FAILURE: How COMPETITION FOR BIG CASES Is 
CORRUPTING THE BANKRUPTCY COURTS (2005). 
6. Much of the debate surrounding Courting Failure has. involved LoPucki's 
suggestion that the Delaware judges and other bankruptcy judges who have 
adopted similar practices are "corrupt." Two of the contributions to this 
symposium offer detailed and persuasive analyses of the corruption rhetoric and 
its implications. A. Mechele Dickerson, Words that Wound: Defining, Discussing 
and Defeating Bankruptcy "Corruption," 54 BUFF. L. REV. 365 (2006); Charles J. 
Tabb, Courting Controversy, 54 BUFF. L. REV. 467 (2006) . 
7. See LOPUCKI, supra note 5, at 231. 
8. See id. at 207-32. 
9. See id. at 204-05. 
''''� ..... 
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however, may be too late because the plague may already 
be "global and out of control . "lO 
It's a frightening story. Fortunately, much of it does not 
appear to be true. A second look at LoPucki's key findings 
in Courting Failure calls his interpretation of U.S. 
bankruptcy venue shopping into question. The evidence 
further suggests that the first hints of regulatory 
competition in Europe should b e  applauded rather than 
condemned. 
The centerpiece of Courting Failure is LoPucki's 
celebrated and much debated finding that nearly a third of 
the largest corporations that filed for bankruptcy in 
Delaware in the 1990s later filed for bankruptcy a second 
time. !l To LoPucki, the refilings, buttressed by his claim 
that Delaware companies perform poorly after they emerge 
from bankruptcy, demonstrate a failure of the Delaware 
process. !2 A closer look at the data, however, suggests that 
the pattern, if there is one, may stem from differences 
between the companies that filed for bankruptcy in 
Delaware and those that filed elsewhere . Companies that 
would most benefit from a quicker reorganization process 
chose Delaware , which specialized in facilitating prompt 
reorganiza tions . 
There is no Delaware in Europe, of course, and my 
conclusions cannot simply be transplanted directly into- the 
European debate . But many of the same factors that 
suggest that bankruptcy venue shopping has done more 
good than harm in the U.S.  are also relevant to the venue 
shopping debate in Europe .  In Europe, as in the U. S . ,  
regulatory competition is likely to  have beneficial effects . 
Moreover, as in the U.S . ,  a regime that provided added 
flexibility while insuring that the choice of insolvency 
regime is determined in advance would prove even more 
effective . 
Part I of this Article analyzes the key empirical findings _ 
that drive LoPucki's analyses and conclusions in Courting 
Failure. Drawing on a more extensive critique co-authored 
with Ken Ayotte , I argue that Delaware's repeat filings are 
10. See id. at 207-32. 
11. Id. at 97. 
12. Id. at 116- 17. 
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fully consistent with a model suggesting that many 
companies should rationally choose a quick workout, rather 
than a thoroughgoing restructuring of operations. 
Moreover, once artificial distortions in LoPucki's 
calculations are corrected, the evidence that Delaware 
companies performed more poorly than companies 
reorganized elsewhere disappears . 1 3  These findings also 
may explain the shift in refiling rates (in particular, an 
increase in refilings by companies reorganized outside of 
Delaware) starting in 1997, when Delaware was stymied by 
its inability to hire additional bankruptcy judges and other 
districts had begun to adopt Delaware practices.  
Part II considers the lessons of these findings for 
Europe. One lesson is that some of the same factors that 
assure that forum shopping does not have a corrosive effect 
in the U.S. also offer grounds for optimism in Europe .  This 
is true despite the fact that the overall stakes of forum 
shopping are much greater in Europe, since Member States 
have very different insolvency regulations, whereas U.S. 
bankruptcy judges all apply the same federal bankruptcy 
law.  Part II argues that a better approach would link both 
corporate and insolvency regulation to a company's choice of 
domicile . Part II also considers the extent to which the 
current mismatch between the flexibility European firms 
have when it comes to corporate regulation, as compared to 
the more limited options in the insolvency context, will 
distort European corporate regulation .  
1. WHAT Do THE VENUE SHOPPING DATA TELL US? 
LoPucki's single most important finding in Courting 
Failure-indeed, the finding that inspired LoPucki's 
ongoing crusade against Delaware-is his discovery that 
companies that reorganized in Delaware in the 1990s 
tumbled back into Chapter 11 at a much greater clip than 
companies that reorganized elsewhere. 14 "The 30 companies 
that emerged from Delaware reorganization in the period 
1991-96, " as he puts it, "were the reorganizations on which 
Delaware had made its reputation as the nation's best 
13. Kenneth Ayotte & David A. Skeel, Jr. ,  An Efficiency-Based Explanation 
for Current Corporate Reorganization Practice, 73 u. CHI. L. REV 425 (2006) 
(reviewing LOPUCKI, supra note 5) . 
14. LOP1LCKl, supra note 5, at 99-100. 
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bankruptcy court . . . .  But by February 20, 2000, nine of 
those 30 reorganizations had already failed. "15 LoPucki's 
investigation of these repeat filings led to a second finding: 
Delaware-reorganized companies seemed to perform 
extremely badly after bankruptcy, whereas non-Delaware 
reorganizations held their ground.16 In the five years after 
bankruptcy, according to LoPucki's calculations , Delaware­
reorganized companies averaged a 9% loss, New York 
companies lost 3%, and companies reorganized elsewhere 
averaged a 1% profit . !7 LoPucki hangs all of his conclusions 
on these two findings (the high refiling rate and large losses 
suffered by Delaware-reorganized companies). 
Based on the two findings , LoPucki concludes that the 
Delaware judges perverted the bankruptcy process in their 
effort to attract large, high profile cases . 18 Delaware's 
judges bent the rules in order to favor the interests of 
debtors' managers and lawyers , and they completely 
abdicated their responsibility to scrutinize the "feasibiliti' 
of a proposed reorganization plan .!9 Delaware, as LoPucki 
has put it, "would confirm a ham sandwich. "20 "Court 
competition was not merely eroding the integrity of the 
courts, it was actually destroying companies."2 1 
What should we make of the two key findings and 
LoPucki's ominous conclusion about the effects of 
bankruptcy venue shopping? 
A. What Should the Judges Have Done? 
Start with the conclusion that Delaware oversight 
hastened the demise of many companies that might have 
survived if the cases had been filed elsewhere. This 
conclusion implies that there were decisions a non­
Delaware judge might have made, but the Delaware judge 
did not, during the course of the case that made a decisive 
15. Id. at 100-0l. 
16. Id. at 101, 112. 
17. Id. at 112-13. 
18. See id. at 255. 
19. See id. at 140-45. 
20. LoPucki made this statement at a conference at Vanderbilt University. 
2l. Id. at 118. 
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difference in the company's fate.  If we look at the cases 
LoPucki identifies as evidence of Delaware's failure, it is 
not obvious what the Delaware court could or should have 
done differently. 22 Spectravision, for instance, filed for 
bankruptcy due to problems with the technology it used for 
its pay-per-view movie services. 23 After emerging from 
bankruptcy, Spectravision switched to  a newer technology, 
but this too proved problematic . Spectravision returned to 
bankruptcy, and was acquired by a competitor during its 
second bankruptcy case. Spectravision's problems were not 
problems that could easily have been prevented by a 
bankruptcy judge. 
When LoPucki was asked at the conference that gave 
rise to this symposium to name a specific decision that a 
Delaware judge could have made to save a viable company, 
he himself could not give any examples. Even with the 
benefit of twenty-twenty hindsight, most of the companies 
that refiled do not appear to be companies whose viability 
would have been preserved by a different bankruptcy judge.  
B. Does a Second Chap ter 11 Filing Show that the Process 
Failed ?  
Turn to the smoking gun, the finding that nine of the 
thirty large companies that emerged from Chapter 11 in 
Delaware in the years 1991-96 later landed back in 
bankruptcy. LoPucki treats this finding as stark evidence of 
a bankruptcy process gone amok.24 Apart from the dangers 
of drawing firm conclusions from such a tiny number of 
cases, do repeat filings even prove that the process has 
failed? 
22. Douglas Baird and Bob Rasmussen have done just this, conducting brief 
but careful case studies of the companies LoPucki points to as evidence of a 
failure in Delaware. See Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Beyond 
Recidivism, 54 BUFF. L. REV 343 (2006); Robert K. Rasmussen, Empirically 
Bankrupt (Vanderbilt Univ. Law Sch. Law & Econ. Working Paper Series, 
Working Paper No. 06-07, 2006) , available at http://ssrn.comlabstract=895547. 
Melissa Jacoby argues that the hands off approach taken by most bankruptcy 
judges is precisely what Congress contemplated when it enacted the 1978 
Bankruptcy Code. See Melissa B. Jacoby, Fast, Cheap, and Creditor-Controlled: 
Is Corporate Reorganization Failing?, 54 BUFF. L. REV. 401, 428-30 (2006) . 
23. For a brief description of the Spectravision saga, see Ayotte & Skeel, 
supra note 13, at 449-50 n.55. 
24. See LO�,yCKI, supra note 5, at 101-03. 
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Not necessarily . To see why, first consider the 
distinctive qualities of Delaware bankruptcy in the 1990s. 
In the 1990s, Delaware was known for prepacks and 
speed. 25 Before Delaware's ascendancy, large Chapter 11  
cases often got off to  a languid start, followed by a fitful 
reorganization process that routinely lasted for several 
years.26 No doubt mindful of the widespread complaints 
that large cases in the 1980s were costly and overly long, 
Dela ware pioneered the practice of providing swift hearings 
on so-called first day orders . The first day orders provided 
for ongoing payment of employees, retention of the debtor's 
bankruptcy lawyers, use of cash that was collateral for a 
secured bank loan, and other matters essential to 
minimizing the disruption of the bankruptcy filing. 27 
During the case, the Delaware judges stood ready to 
schedule hearings at a moment's notice . Delaware quickly 
became the forum of choice for cases such as prepackaged 
bankruptcies where time was thought to be of es.sence. 
LoPucki initially questioned whether Delaware cases 
truly were faster than reorganization cases elsewhere. 28 
But subsequent studies have consistently found a speed 
differential, and LoPucki himself now recognizes the 
difference . The question,  then, is whether companies would 
rationally file for bankruptcy in Delaware to take 
advantage of the faster process, even though a quick, low 
cost Delaware reorganization might be followed by a second 
Chapter 1 1  filing? 
25. See Skeel, supra note 2, at 27. This does not mean that every Delaware 
case was fast, of course--just that Delaware generally facilitated a prompter 
reorganization process than other courts. 
26. LoPucki himself offered some of the most important evidence that delay 
was the biggest problem with Chapter 11 in the 1980s, although his findings 
suggested that the largest cases were not appreciably longer than large cases 
before the 1978 Code. See Lynn M. LoPucki, The Trouble with Chapter 11, 1993 
WIS. L. REV. 729. 
27. See, e.g., Marvin Krasny & Kevin J. Carey, Editors Reply to an 
Anonymous Letter: Why is Delaware the Venue of Choice lor Philadelphia-Based 
Companies?, THE LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Mar. 22, 1996, at 9. 
28. Theodore Eisenberg & Lynn M. LoPucki, Shopping for Judges: An 
Empirical Analysis of Venue Choice in Large Chapter 11 Reorganizations, 84 
CORNELL L. REV. 967, 983 (1999) (finding "no robust evidence in the pattern of 
filings or processing times that suggests Delaware offers a more efficient forum 
for resolving large Chapter 11 cases . ... "). 
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In related work,29 Ken Ayotte and I develop a simple, 
formal model that assumes companies have a choice 
whether to conduct a thoroughgoing restructuring of the 
sort that LoPucki seems to think is essential in all Chapter 
11 cases (we call this a Restructuring) or a quicker ,  less 
intensive restructuring that adjusts the company's capital 
structure without restructuring the company's operations 
(which we call a Workout). 3o We further assume that the 
parties do not know for sure whether the company will 
prove to be viable after Chapter 11, and that there are three 
possible future states of the world: Good, Bad, and 
Medium.31 If the Good state materializes, the company will 
prove viable regardless of whether its bankruptcy was a 
Restructuring or a Workout; the Bad will lead to failure 
under either approach, and in the Medium state, the 
company will be viable, but only if its operations are 
thoroughly reworked through a Restructuring (either in the 
initial Chapter 11 case or after a subsequent filing) . 32 
Based on these quite plausible assumptions, the model 
suggests that the less costly Workout may prove superior to 
a more costly but more thorough Restructuring if one or 
more of four conditions holds true: 
1. There is a large cost differential between a 
Restructuring and a Workout; (The intuition here is that a 
Workout may be preferable if it saves a great deal of 
money.)33 
29. Ayotte & Skeel, supra note 13. 
30. ld. at 437 -53. 
31. ld. at 439. 
32. Under these assumptions, the parties should choose a Workout if: 
(pG + pM)(l + d) + pBL - R < pG + pM(l-R) + pBL - X - L, where pG is the 
probability of the Good state, pB is the probability of Bad, and pM is the 
probability of Medium. The value of the company's current cash flow in the 
Good state is 1; d is the value of the company's future cash flow, as a result of a 
full Restructuring, in Medium and Good states; R is the cost of a Restructuring 
and W is the cost of a Workout (and W < R); and X is the amount of losses 
incurred after bankruptcy in the event a full Restructuring is not undertaken. 
See id. at 438-41. For a detailed description of the model, see id. at 438-40. This 
formula simplifies to: (l-pB)d < (R-W) - pMR - X, which is the basis for the 
conclusions described in the next paragraph . See id. at 440. 
33. This possibility was previously suggested by several other 
commentators, and dismissed by LoPucki as "[p]erhaps the most brazen 
argument
�,-
put forth on Delaware's behalf. " LOPUCKl, supra note S, at 108 
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2. The losses that occur after the initial reorganization 
and before the parties learn which state of the world has 
materialized are small; (If losses will b e  s.mall, the costs of 
waiting to see if an intensive restructuring is necessary 
may be low.) 
3. The probability of the Medium state is low; (If the 
odds are relatively small that a thoroughgoing 
restructuring will later be necessary, the "option value " of 
waiting, rather than conducting a thorough Restructuring 
and running the risk it will prove to have been unnecessary, 
are high.) 
4. The probability of the Bad state is high . (The 
intuition here is that it may not make sense to conduct a 
thoroughgoing restructuring if the odds are high that the 
company will prove unviable even after an intensive 
Restructuring.) 34 
The initial model assumes that there are no conflicts of 
interest, and all of the parties wish to maximize the overall 
value of the company. In the real world, of course, things 
are not so simple. A debtor's managers may wish to avoid a 
thoroughgoing restructuring, for instance , since they will 
generally be displaced in a Restructuring. If we add the 
likelihood that managers will avoid a Restructuring if they 
can, the model yields another important insight: in order to 
assure that the company is fully restructured, if necessary, 
creditors will choose a different amount of debt if the 
company pursues a Restructuring in the initial bankruptcy, 
than if it opts for a Workout instead . After a Restructuring, 
creditors should prefer a relatively small amount of debt, 
whereas they should set the debt level higher if the initial 
bankruptcy is a Workout. 35 
Overall, the model suggests that a bankruptcy court 
that processes cases more quickly and efficiently than its 
(describing the argument put forth by Bob Rasmussen and Randall Thomas, 
which was later suggested in comments by Jesse Fried, that "Delaware's 
refilings were not failures but merely the unfortunate, inevitable by· product of 
smart risktaking") . The data described in Part I.e below suggest that LoPucki 
dismissed the argument too quickly. See infra Part I.e. 
34. Ayotte & Skeel, supra note 13, at 440. 
35. The higher debt load after a Workout is designed to force the company to 
engage in a thoroughgoing Restructuring if the Medium state materializes. This 
is not necessary after a Restructuring because the company's operations will 
already have been fully restructured. 
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peers will tend to attract companies that, on balance, are 
more likely to fail after they complete their initial Chapter 
11 case.36 These companies will tend to emerge with more 
debt in their capital structure than companies that file 
elsewhere and undergo a costly Restructuring. These 
findings suggest an alternative explanation for a series of 
empirical studies that have shown that prepackaged 
bankruptcies and out-of-bankruptcy workouts do not reduce 
a company's debt as much as a full-blown bankruptcy 
does.37  Although the studies tend to treat the higher 
leverage as a shortcoming of prepacks and workouts, the 
model suggests that the high leverage may sometimes be 
optimal. 38 I t keeps the debtor on a tight leash and 
facilitates monitoring by the debtor's bank, lenders, or other 
creditors. 
In short, LoPucki supports his conclusion that the 
Delaware bankruptcy court failed in the 1990s by pointing 
to the high refiling rates of companies that reorganized in 
Delaware .39 The high refiling rate, however, can lead to an 
alternative conclusion. The model suggests that the high 
rate of refilings is best explained as a selection effect, with 
companies that would benefit from a quick, low cost process 
gravitating to Delaware and with other companies taking 
their bankruptcy filings elsewhere.40 
C. The Perfor mance of Delaware Firms After Bankruptcy . 
The analysis thus far offers a very different perspective 
on-and much more p lausible interpretation of-LoPucki's 
36. Ayotte & Skeel, supra note 13, at 441, 443. 
37. See, e.g., Stuart C. Gilson ,  Transactions Costs and Capital Structure 
Choice: Evidence From Financially Distressed Firms, 52 J. FIN. 161 (1997) 
(finding that transaction costs discourage debt reductions by financially 
distressed firms when they restructure their debt out of court). 
38. See Ayotte & Skeel, supra note 13, at 439 n . 24, 450-5l. 
39. LOPUCKI, supra note 5, at 97-12l. 
40. These conclusions are entirely consistent with Baird and Rasmussen's 
analysis of the individual cases and suggest that they do not fit LoPucki's 
claims about pernicious bankruptcy court decision making. See Baird & 
Rasmussen, supra note 22, at 355-62. Baird and Rasmussen emphasize the high 
percentage of prepacks and prenegotiated cases in Delaware, for instance. See 
id. at 347-48. These are precisely the cases that fit the Workout mode described 
in the model in the previous section. See supra pp. 447-49. 
--::-
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finding that Delaware's Chapter 1 1  bankruptcy system 
leads to a high refiling rate for reorganized companies .  But 
it doesn't speak directly to LoPucki's second key claim, 
which is that Delaware-reorganized companies 
hemorrhaged cash after they emerged from Chapter 1l.41  
Whereas the problem with the first finding is LoPucki's 
interpretation, the problem with the second claim is the 
finding itself. Upon further inspection, the finding proves to 
be a mirage. 
The mirage arises from two artificial numbers in 
LoPucki's calculations . First, when corporate debtors 
emerge from Chapter 1 1 , they generally use fresh start 
accounting to account for the adjustments made in Chapter 
1l. Under fresh start accounting, the difference between the 
company's estimated market value and the liquidation 
value of its assets is treated as an intangible asset and 
amortized over time. Although this "asset" is completely 
artificial, LoPucki's profitability measure treats its 
amortization as if it were a real cost, and deducts it from 
profits .42 Second, a large portion of the losses in the 
Delaware cases stemmed from asset writedowns . These 
writedowns, which reset the company's accounting when it 
emerges from bankruptcy, can almost always be traced to 
the problems that landed the company in bankruptcy, 
rather than to the bankruptcy process itself. Finally, 
LoPucki's calculations deduct the interest obligations on the 
company's debt from the profit calculations .43 This 
calculation is misleading, however, because a company's 
debt is irrelevant to its operating profits .  Moreover, the 
calculation is particularly prejudicial to Delaware because 
Delaware-reorganized companies emerge from bankruptcy 
with higher leverage than companies that filed elsewhere . 
If we compare the Delaware reorganized companies that 
emerged from bankruptcy between 1991 and 1996 to 
companies reorganized elsewhere, using a measure that 
corrects for each of these biases, the differences in 
profitability are insignificant. It turns out that Delaware 
did not send out leaky ships, as compared to the sleek 
schooners that emerged from other districts, after all. To 
41. See LOPUCKI, supra note 5, at 109-10. 
42. See Ayotte & Skeel, supra note 13, at 445-46. 
43. See id. 
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the contrary, Delaware appears to have offered a procedure 
that fit the needs of the companies that filed there . 
D .  The Disappearing Delaware Effect  in the Late 1990s 
For companies emerging from bankruptcy starting in 
1997, the refiling rates that occupy so much of LoPucki's 
attention suddenly shifted. Delaware's refiling rate 
remained high-eleven of the twenty four .(46%) c.ompanies 
emerging in the years 1997-2000 refiled-but the refiling 
rates for other courts skyrocketed.44 Four of the six (67%) 
New York cases that emerged during this period 
subsequently refiled, and six of the thirteen (46%) cases 
that were filed elsewhere made a return visit to Chapter 
11.45 "Something must have caused these sudden, 
simultaneous changes at the end of 1996," LoPucki marvels , 
as he surveys the new landscape. 46 ''Yet Congress made no 
change in the bankruptcy laws during the relevant period 
and the courts handed down no major bankruptcy 
decisions. "47 What explains the disappearing Delaware 
effect , and what should we make of it? 
The shift in filing rates almost certainly stems in 
important part from the buffeting Delaware took in 1996 
and 1997.48 In the summer of 1996, the National 
Bankruptcy Review Commission released its initial 
proposal that domicile be removed as a basis for venue .49 By 
early 1997, Delaware. District Court Judge Farnan had 
taken control of the assignment of Delaware bankruptcy 
cases and the movement to eliminate Delaware venue was 
steadily picking up steam.  Coupled with this was 
Delaware's inability to do anything about its overcrowded 
docket. Delaware's success had attracted a large number of 
cases-too many for its two judges to easily handle.  If 
bankruptcy cases were a matter of state oversight, 
Delaware could have simply added several new bankruptcy 
44. See infra note 45. 
45. See LOPUCKI, supra note 5, at 120 tbl. 7. 
46. Id. at 120. 
47. Id. at 120-21. 
48. See id. at 77-93, for a detailed chronicle of these events. 
49 . See id . 
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judgeships.50 But because bankruptcy is federal , Delaware 
was forced to wait on Congress, which did not give 
Delaware any new judgeships until new bankruptcy 
legislation was enacted in 2005.  In the meantime, 
bankruptcy courts in other districts began to adopt some of 
the practices that Delaware had pioneered, such as prompt 
approval of first day orders. 
It is important to be  cautious about the significance we 
attach to the shift in 1997, given the tiny number of cases 
involved. But to the extent it reflects a meaningful 
development, it suggests that Delaware had become 
marginally less attractive as a venue, and (at least some) 
other districts were beginning to see cases that were similar 
to Delaware cases and might previously have been filed in 
Delaware . 51 
Notice that this conclusion is entirely consistent with 
the model developed in the earlier sections of this Article . 52 
If other courts began to adopt Delaware-like practices in the 
late 1990s,  we might expect some of the cases that would 
benefit from a Workout rather than a Restructuring to go to 
other courts, rather than Delaware .53 If they did, we might 
expect to see more refilings in other courts, not because the 
process was failing, but because more cases where the 
optimal strategy might lead to a second -filing were being 
filed outside of Delaware. There also appears to have been a 
shift in the kinds of cases being filed, with far fewer of the 
prepackaged cases that constituted a substantial share of 
the large Delaware cases in the 1990s. 
LoPucki, of course, offers a very different diagnosis. In 
his view, the skirmishes between Delaware and its 
opponents starting in 1996 "focused the world's attention on 
50. For an argument in favor of permitting the states to regulate corporate 
bankruptcy, just as they regulate other aspects of corporate law, see David A. 
Skeel, Jr., Rethinking the Line Between Corporate Law and Corporate 
Bankruptcy, 72 TEX. L. REV. 471 (1994). 
51. The recent petitions that were filed elsewhere include many of the 
largest corporate scandal cases, including Enron, WorldCom and, more recently, 
Refco. See In re Enron Corp.,  No. 01-16034 (S.D.N.Y. filed Dec. 2, 2001); In re 
WorldCom Inc . ,  No . 02-13533 (S.D.N.Y. filed July 21, 2002); In re Refco Inc . ,  No. 
05-60006-rdd (S.D.N.Y. filed Oct. 17, 2005). 
52. See supra pp. 447-49. 
53. Similarly, if the most difficult cases tended to go to Delaware prior to 
1997, some of these cases may have begun filing elsewhere thereafter .  
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the loss of cases to Delaware ."54 Other courts got on the 
stick and started copying Delaware's "methods in order to 
match Delaware's attractiveness . . . .  As Delaware responded 
by adopting changes of its own, the competition intensified, 
transformed the bankruptcy system, and ultimately 
corrupted additional courts. "55 
The problem with this diagnosis is that the Delaware 
approach 'appears far more likely to have been a success 
than a failure . 56 If a second bankruptcy filing in Delaware 
often reflected an optimal decision to opt for a Workout 
rather than a Restructuring, it is quite plausible that this 
was also the case for at least some non-Delaware refilers 
starting in 1997. We would need to examine the cases to 
know for sure-particularly given that most other courts 
could not match the Delaware judges' experience and 
expertise in big cases. But LoPucki's assessment of the 
other courts, as with his indictment of Delaware, makes the 
mistake of assuming that repeat filings must be evidence 
that the Chapter 11 process has failed. 
II. GLOBAL AND OUT OF CONTROL?: LESSONS FOR EUROPE 
Across the Atlantic , Europe is now experiencing its own 
regulatory competition debate in corporate and insolvency 
law. These developments are not lost on LoPucki . Indeed, 
the recent course of ED Insolvency Regulation is "Exhibit 
A "  for LoPucki's contention that the corruption that began 
in Delaware seems to have infected Europe as well , and 
may be spreading throughout the world. 
The European debate began with a trilogy of cases that 
have dramatically increased companies' ability to choose 
the corporate laws that will regulate their internal affairs.57 
54. LOPUCKI, supra note 5, at 122. 
55.Id. 
56. As Melissa Jacoby points out, there also is a temporal problem with 
LoPucki's claim that Delaware corruption infected the rest of the nation. See 
Jacoby, supra note 22, at 414. Although the increase in refilings by non­
Delaware reorganized companies starts in 1997, LoPucki's anecdotal evidence of 
efforts by other courts to compete with Delaware is based on events that do not 
take place until 2000 and thereafter. 
57. Case C-212/97, Centros Ltd v .  Erhvervs- og Selskabsstyrelsen, (Mar. 9, 
1999) (Den.) , http://europa.eu.int/eur-lexJlexJLexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri= 
CELEX:61997J0212:EN:HTML. As noted below, the central holding of Centros 
-=: .... : 
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As two European scholars recount: 
In March 1999, the European Court of Justice's decision in the 
Centros case paved the way for company law arbitrage within the 
ED, by granting European businesses the right to incorporate in 
any ED Member State no matter where their business is run and 
correspondingly preventing Member States from imposing their 
own corporate law on such businesses, other than under very 
limited circumstances. 58 
In the wake of Centros and a pair of cases that 
subsequently confirmed its central holding,  a large numb er 
of companies located in continental Europe have crossed the 
English Channel to incorporate in England, apparently in 
large part to evade local minimum capital rules.59 
European companies have less room to maneuver with 
insolvency law, but here too there are major developments 
afoot . In 2000, the E C  adopted a new regulation governing 
insolvency proceedings .6o The new regulation contemplates 
that the main insolvency proceeding will be opened in the 
courts of the country where a debtor has its "centre of main 
interests" (COMI), and that secondary proceedings can be 
initiated in other countries where the debtor has an 
establishment.61 The ED Insolvency Regulation lies at the 
heart of LoPucki's claim that American-style venue 
shopping may now be poised to go "global and out of 
was reaffirmed in the subsequent Uberseering and Inspire Art decisions. See 
Case C-20S/00, Uberseering BV v. Nordic Construction Company 
Baumanagement GmbH (NCC) (Nov. 9, 2002) (F.RG.), http://europa.eu.int/eur­
lex/lexiLexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:62000J020S:EN:HTML; Case C-
167/01, Kamer van Koophandel en Fabrieken voor Amsterdam v. Inspire Art 
Ltd. (Sep. 30, 2003) (Neth.), http://europa.eu.int/eurlexilexiLexUriServ/ 
LexUriServ.do?uri-CELEX:62001J0167:EN:HTML. 
5S. Luca Enriques & Martin Gelter, The Relationship Between Creditors 
and Corporate Debtors: Regulatory Competition and Cooperation Within the EU, 
7 EuR. Bus. ORG. L. REV. (forthcoming 2006). 
59. See, e.g., Marco Becht et al., Corporate Mobility Comes to Europe-The 
Evidence (Mar. 12, 2006), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/so13Ipapers. 
cfm ?abstract_id=S90512. 
60. See Council Regulation 1346/2000, European Union Regulation on 
Insolvency Proceedings, 2000 O.J. (L160) 1 (EC). 
61. Id. Article 2 defines "establishment" as "any place of operations where 
the debtor carries out a non-transitory economic activity with human means 
and goods." 
. 
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control . "62 The brewing crisis , LoPucki suggests , can be 
traced to two aspects of the new regulation.63 First, the new 
provision nudges European insolvency regulation in a more 
"universalist " direction, displacing the traditional 
"territorial " approach.64 In a universalist insolvency regime, 
every aspect of an insolvency case is governed by a single 
set of insolvency laws, even if the company's assets are 
located in a variety of different countries .65 Under 
territorialism,  by contrast, the laws of each country where a 
company's assets are located govern the assets that can be . 
found within that country .66 By providing for a main 
proceeding in one country, rather than separate 
proceedings of equal status in each of the relevant 
countries, LoPucki argues, the insolvency regulation adopts 
a universalist framework, and plants the seed of American­
style forum shopping.67 "Once the court of an EU country 
determines for itself that it is the debtor's home country 
and declares its own case the 'main proceeding,'" he warns, 
"the courts of other EU countries are obligated to recognize 
it as such ."68 If the court rules that it is the appropriate 
location for the main proceeding, he continues, it will be 
very difficult to upset that determination, even if it is 
rather dubious . 69 
The second problem is the COMI standard itself. 
Although the COMI test is ostensibly designed to pinpoint a 
single, logical forum for any insolvency proceeding, LoPucki 
argues that the parties can manipulate the COMI standard 
62. See LOPUCKI, supra note 5, at 207. 
63. See infra notes 64-65. 
64. LOPUCKI, supra note 5, at 214 ("The second universalist victory came in 
2000, when the European Union adopted the Regulation on Insolvency . . . .  ") .  
65. See, e.g., id. a t  208 (explaining universalism) . 
66. The choice between universalism and territorialism has generated a 
substantial debate in the legal literature. See generally Colloquy: International 
Bankruptcy, Empirical Research in Commercial Transactions, 98 MICH. L. REV. 
2177 (2000) . In LoPucki's contribution to the symposium, as in Courting 
Failure, he excoriates the universalism favored by most legal scholars and 
argues for a territorialist approach. See Lynn M. LoPucki, The Case for 
Cooperative Territoriality in International Bankruptcy, 98 MICH. L. REV. 2216 
(2000) . 
67. LOPUCKI, supra note 5, at 214. 
68. Id. at 215. 
69. Id. 
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at will .7° "All the case placer need do to forum shop," he 
concludes , "is make a plausible argument that the chosen 
court is the 'centre of main interestsL1' " based on its 
registered office, headquarters, location of employees or 
operations , or assets . 71 "The chosen court will do the rest, 
pondering the issues and then solemnly concluding that the 
debtor is indeed correct ."72 In short, the universalist 
approach and the COMI standard give case placers the 
incentive to seek, and Member States· to supply, an 
insolvency process that favors their interests at the expense 
of everyone else .  
The discussion that follows begins by assuming that 
LoPucki is right about one thing: the ED Insolvency 
Regulation makes at least some venue shopping possible. If 
so, what lessons can be taken from the American experience 
and applied to the European context? The section that 
follows points out some of the practical limitations on 
insolvency venue shopping in the ED, and argues that the 
more important question in Europe is whether the greater 
flexibility to choose corporate insolvency law will distort 
European regulation of corporate law and insolvency. The 
final section then offers a proposal for addressing the 
distortions.  
A. Is European Forum Shopping Worrisome? 
Although LoPucki overstates the likely effect of the new 
ED Insolvency Regulation, as discussed in more detail 
below,73 he correctly diagnoses the general trend. The 
orientation of the regulation is indeed universalist, and the 
COMI standard is imprecise enough to give more than one 
option as to the location of insolvency proceedings for· at 
least some companies.74 What does the analysis of the 
previous part tell us about the implications of the U. S. 
experience for the European context? 
70. See infra notes 71-72. 
71. See LOPUCKI, supra note 5; at 217·18. 
72. Id. at 218. 
73. See infra Part ILB. 
74. See, e.g., Horst Eidenmuller, Free Choice in International Company 
Insolvency Law in Europe, 6 EUR. Bus. ORG. L. REV. 423, 430 (2005) (describing 
the standard as "fuzzy and manipulable"). 
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Start with the evidence we have seen that bankruptcy 
venue shopping is not necessarily bad, and in fact can be 
affirmatively beneficial. In  the U.S . ,  corporate debtors 
flocked to Delaware because of the court's expertise and the 
speed of the Delaware reorganization process.  As we also 
have seen, the pattern of repeat bankruptcy filings appears 
to reflect a selection effect, where debtors that would 
benefit from a prompt Chapter 11 filed their cases in 
Delaware, while other companies filed in their local district. 
If this is correct, it suggests that the companies that stayed 
home, and those that went to Delaware, all may have made 
the right filing decision. 
The first question, of course, is whether we could expect 
this pattern to be replicated in European insolvency cases. 
The answer is probably no for the short run, but possibly 
yes in the mid- or long- term. Delaware's rapid success 
stemmed in important part from its role as the preeminent 
state of incorporation. Although bankruptcy is regulated .by 
Congress, corporate law belongs to the states, and 
companies trust the Delaware brand and the influence of 
Delaware corporate culture . 75 In Europe, by contrast, there 
is no corporate "Delaware" to serve as a focal point for 
insolvency venue shopping. The closest analogue is 
England, which has already begun to attract a substantial 
number of companies whose operations are located 
elsewhere. Notwithstanding LoPucki's dire warnings, 
however, there still are questions concerning a comp any's 
ability to shift its headquarters to England at the last 
minute to justify an English insolvency filing .76 Moreover, 
even after substantial recent reforms, the English 
insolvency rules do not offer much of a carrot for the 
managers who would need to initiate such a move , nor do 
the insolvency rules of any of the other major jurisdictions. 
The prospect of bankruptcy venue shopping cannot be 
ruled out altogether, however, which leads us to the second 
75. These factors are emphasized in David A.  Skeel, Jr. ,  Lockups and 
Delaware Venue in Corporate Law and Bankruptcy, 6.8 U. GIN. L. REv. 1243, 
1278 (2000) [hereinafter Skeel, Lockups] ; David A. Skeel, Jr . ,  What 's So Bad 
About Delaware?, 54 V AND . L. Rev . 309, 328-29 (2001) [hereinafter Skeel, What's 
So Bad?] . 
76. See, e.g. , Enriques & Gelter, supra note 58 (manuscript at 53, on file 
with author) (noting that forum shopping is unlikely with firms whose 
operations are located in only a single country). 
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issue: are there serious downside risks to the possibility of 
European forum shopping? The chief danger of permitting 
comp anies to choose where to file for bankruptcy, especially 
at the last minute, is , as LoPucki so colorfully alleges,  that 
the company and its professionals will choose a location 
that serves themselves but not the other constituencies of 
the firm.77 If the filing location is determined in advance, a 
company's choice of filing location may be subject to market 
discipline-the company may be forced to pay a higher 
interest rate or bear a higher cost of equity capital when it 
raises money, for instance, if any bankruptcy will be filed in 
a location that favors managers and lawyers at the expense 
of the company's other constituencies . 78 But if the managers 
and lawyers are permitted to make this choice at the last 
minute , they will not face the same market discipline . A 
court or country that wished to attract large scale 
insolvency cases could therefore invite managers and their 
lawyers to help themselves to the company's till , without 
either the thieves or the jurisdictions that love them 
needing to worry about capital market discipline. 
This is the theory. The U.S .  reality is quite different. As 
an account of U.S .  practice ,  especially as it has evolved in 
recent years , the race to the bottom story ignores a major 
check on the choice of venue: the debtor-in-possession banks 
that have come to dominate the governance of the largest 
Chapter 11 cases .79 As most large companies near 
bankruptcy, they are desperate for cash and turn to 
existing or outside banks for financing. The bank financers 
use the financing agreement to exert substantial control 
77. LOPUCKI, supra note 5, at 133. 
The lawyers and executives who choose venues for large public 
companies-the case placers-are hard-nosed businesspeople. They 
know they have something to offer: tens or hundreds of millions of 
dollars of business for local bankruptcy practitioners. They expect 
something in return: advantages their bankruptcy courts at home 
would not give them. 
78. This point, and the fact that the U.S. bankruptcy venue rule does not 
require a prior commitment of this smt, is a majoy theme of Robert K. 
Rasmussen & Randall S. Thomas, Timing Matters: Promoting Forum Shopping 
by Insolvent Corporations, 94 Nw. U .  L. REV. 1357, 1359 (2000) . 
79. I have discussed this phenomenon at length elsewhere. See, e.g. , Ayotte 
& Skeel, supra note 13, at 462-67 (discussing lenders as influence on venue 
choice) ; David A .  Skeel, Jr., The Past, Present and Future of Debtor-in­
Possession Financing, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 1 905 (2004) . 
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over the debtor, both before and in bankruptcy. These 
banks would not simply look the other way while the debtor 
and its managers filed for bankruptcy in a jurisdiction that 
favored their interests over those of everyone else. Indeed, 
the banks themselves often appear to be the ones who make 
the venue decision. 
In Europe, corporate creditors have even more influence 
in corporate and insolvency law, which suggests that we 
could expect them to be at least as effective a check on 
managers' filing decisions as are U. S .  lenders . Indeed, 
creditors currently are the ones who file most European 
insolvency cases because most European countries have 
manager displacing insolvency regimes .80 It is possible that 
this will change as European corporate and insolvency laws 
evolve . But the fact that creditors exert significant control 
even in the U.S . ,  which has one of the world's most 
manager friendly bankruptcy regimes, is strong evidence 
that European insolvency forum shopping is unlikely to 
degenerate into a race to the bottom of the sort LoPucki 
predicts . 
Rather than the risk of expropriation by managers and 
their lawyers, the more important concern is whether the 
most influential creditors will divert value to themselves at 
the expense of other creditors . In the U. S . ,  this is a concern 
in some contexts, but overall, creditor control has 
significantly improved the Chapter 11 process . 81 Creditor 
influence is likely to have a similarly benign influence on 
European insolvency law. 
There is another reason not to worry about the prospect 
of European venue shopping. The new EU Insolvency 
Regulation does not contemplate that the location of the 
main proceeding will handle the entire insolvency case if 
some or most of a company's operations are located 
elsewhere .82 Rather, the regulation contemplates secondary 
proceedings in the other Member States where a company 
80. See, e.g. , Luca Enriques & Martin Gelter, How the Old World 
Encountered the New One: Regulatory Competition and Cooperation in 
European Corporate and Bankruptcy Law 67 (2006) (unpublished manuscript, 
on file with author). 
81. See, e.g., Ayotte & Skeel, supra note 13, at 464. 
82. See Council Regulation 1346/2000, European Union Regulation on 
Insolvency Proceedings, 2000 O .J. (L160) 1 (EC). 
,-;: ...  
460 B UFFALO LA W REVIEW [Vol. 54 
has an establishment. 83 These secondary proceedings 
should serve as a significant protection for creditors and 
other stakeholders in the Member States where the 
secondary proceedings are set Up.84 
B.  Insolvency Law as a Sub Rosa Source of Company Law ? 
Although LoPucki imagines that the floodgates have 
opened for European insolvency venue shopping, the more 
salient characteristic of the new EU Insolvency Regulation 
is the impediments it currently imposes on forum shopping. 
Whereas U.S. law permits companies to select any state's 
corporate law and nearly any bankruptcy venue , European 
companies have much more flexibility in choosing their 
charter than in picking an insolvency court.85 If this 
mismatch continues ,86 there are several important 
implications for European company and insolvency 
regulation. 
First, differential treatment of company and insolvency 
regulation magnifies the significance of where a provision is 
located. Lawmakers who wish to attract companies to their 
country will focus on reforming company rather than 
insolvency law because company law can be exported. 
Similarly, lawmakers who wish to prevent companies that 
are physically located in the country from evading 
regulatory restrictions can achieve this effect through 
insolvency regulation. 
The most prominent illustration of the potential 
consequences of whether a provision is located in company 
or insolvency law is the forum shopping that has emerged 
with respect to minimum capital rules .  Germany relies 
83. Id. 
84. See Armour, supra note 4, at 25. 
85. The principal limitation in the U.S. stems from federal provision of the 
bankruptcy laws. A company can choose the state that supplies its general 
corporate law, and it can choose the location where it files for bankruptcy. But 
the bankruptcy laws themselves are federal. For an analysis of the distortions 
this creates, see Skeel, supra note 50, at 489. 
86. Armour speculates that a company's registered office, its domicile, may 
increasingly be presumed to be its COMI. Armour, supra note 4, at 26-29. Such 
a presumption would significantly increase the scope for venue shopping, 
especially if the barriers to companies' ability to shift their registered office 
midstream also are removed. 
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heavily on an elaborate system of minimum capital rules in 
its company law to protect creditors. This means that 
companies based in Germany can evade the German capital 
rules by incorporating elsewhere .87 On the other hand, if 
creditor protections are located in a country's insolvency 
laws, they usually will apply even to companies that move 
their domicile elsewhere. Thus, England's wrongful trading 
rules, which are an important creditor protection for 
E nglish companies, will be  much harder to evade because 
the rules are located in England's insolvency law. 
It is too early to tell whether the stickiness of 
insolvency law will significantly alter European lawmaking. 
Lawmakers cannot simply designate any provision they 
wish as an insolvency provision. Provisions that are not 
limited to the bankruptcy context, for instance, may not be 
construed as insolvency provisions, and may not be applied, 
even if they are carefully tucked into a country's insolvency 
law.88 The "relabeling of company law provisions as 
insolvency law," in the words of two European scholars, 
"may only work provided that these provisions are properly 
'insolvencified,' i .e .  so long as a (sufficient) number of 
features linking them to the insolvency proceeding and its 
objectives are introduced. "89 If this proposition is correct, 
new provisions will only apply if a company does, in fact, 
land in insolvency proceedings, which will limit the extent 
to which lawmakers can prevent companies from avoiding 
local company law rules .  Limiting, however, is not the same 
thing as preventing. To the extent company law is subject 
to more regulatory competition than insolvency law, the 
mismatch could distort lawmakers' regulatory focus .  
87. This does not mean, however, that troubled Germany-based companies 
that move their domicile to England can make distributions with impunity. 
Germany has fraudulent conveyance provisions in its insolvency laws that will 
apply if these companies enter insolvency proceedings. 
88. Provisions that might interfere with a company's "freedom of 
establishment" are invalidated unless they meet the four part Gebhard test. 
Gebhard requires that a provision be (1) nondiscriminatory in its application, 
(2) required by the public interest, (3) tailored to meet the public interest 
concern in question, and (4) proportionate in its effect. Case C-55/94, Gebhard v. 
Colsiglio dell'Ordine degli Avvocati e Procuratori de Milano, 1995 E .C.R. 1-4165 . 
89. Enriques & Gelter, supra note 58 (manuscript at 5 1, an file with author). 
'.�!:.. 
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C. To Constrain or  Unleash European Regulatory 
Competition 
[Vol. 54 
Notice the irony in the previous section. Although 
LoPucki warns that the new EU insolvency rule may lead to 
ruinous forum shopping, the most pressing regulatory 
issues stem from the comparative difficulty, not the ease, of 
bankruptcy forum shopping. The parties' ability to choose 
their company law, but relative inability to opt (}ut of their 
local insolvency law, creates a sharp cleavage between the 
effects of company law, on the one hand, and insolvency 
regulation on the other hand. Should anything be done 
about the mismatch between the EU's treatment of 
company and insolvency law? 
A response that is consistent with the spirit of 
LoPucki's conclusions in Courting Failure would be for E U  
decision makers to clamp down o n  regulatory arbitrage in 
both com pany and insolvency la w. 90 This would 
reinvigorate the traditional territorialism in European 
company and insolvency law. The country where the 
company's main operations were located would govern all 
aspects of its existence. No need to worry about companies 
picking and choosing the laws that apply to them. This 
hostility to regulatory competition, however, is problematic 
for a variety of different reasons. The first is that regulatory 
competition has made things better rather than worse in 
the U.S .  context . Stifling competition in Europe would cut 
off the possibility of similar benefits . Second, the dangers of 
European regulatory competition are quite limited. Even if 
the regulatory obstacles were removed, charter and 
insolvency competition would be likely to remain less 
vigorous in Europe than in the U.S .  In the insolvency 
context, the existence of secondary proceedings in each 
other Member State where the company has an 
establishment will limit the scope of the main proceeding. 
In addition,  cultural, language and other differences may 
encourage many companies to stick with their home 
jurisdiction both for corporate law and for any insolvency 
proceeding. Finally, creditors can constrain a company's 
90. LoPucki does not explicitly call for federalization of U.S . corporate law, 
but his dim view of Delaware's preeminence suggests that he would favor, or at 
the least would be agnostic about, retrenchment on corporate charter 
competition in the U.S . ,  and by extension, in Europe. 
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regulatory choices to some extent . A lender that is 
concerned about opportunistic reincorporation to another 
Member State could make reincorporation a default under 
the parties' credit agreement. Although bankruptcy forum 
shopping is more difficult to constrain, the U.S .  experience 
suggests that creditors will often exert significant influence 
over a debtor's choice of venue . 
Rather than foreclosing regulatory choice altogether, 
one alternative-in my view a far more promising 
alternative-would preserve companies' flexibility to opt 
into a particular nation's corporate laws by domiciling in 
that nation, but would apply this choice to both corporate 
law and insolvency regulation.91 Under this approach, a 
company domiciled in England would be subj ect to English 
insolvency law as well as English company law. For a 
company domiciled in Germany, both German company and 
insolvency law would apply.92 Linking corporate and 
insolvency law to domicile would sharply reduce any risk 
that a company would choose an insolvency regime at the 
last minute to the benefit of insiders and the detriment of 
everyone else . The location and source of regulation would 
be clear because it would be determined by the company's 
domicile. Treating corporate and insolvency law as a 
seamless web would also eliminate the regulatory 
distortions that have been created by the differential 
treatment of corporate and insolvency law.93 
One objection to giving companies a choice of insolvency 
regimes is that while large creditors can protect themselves,  
the choice may be used to divert value from tort and other 
9 l .  I have argued elsewhere for a similar approach in the U.S .  context, 
suggesting that companies be required to file their bankruptcy cases in their 
state of incorporation. See Skeel, supra note 2, at 37-38; Skeel, Lockups, supra 
note 75, at 1275; Skeel, What's So Bad?, supra note 75, at 327. For an argument 
similar to the one I make here with respect to EU regulatory competition, see 
Eidenmuller, supra note 74, at 446-47. 
92. If the location of a company's registered office were presumptively 
deemed to be its COMI, this presumption would link corporate and insolvency 
law in precisely the way I have advocated. 
93. By itself, the domicile-based approach does not address the possibility 
that a company might change venues on the eve of bankruptcy in order to take 
advantage of another Member State's manager (and possibly shareholder) 
friendly insolvency regime. As I have noted elsewhere, this concern could easily 
be addressed by disallowing eve of bankruptcy venue changes. Skeel, supra note 
2, at 38. 
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nonadjusting creditors. But value will be diverted from 
nonadjusting creditors only to the extent that they are both 
truly nonadjusting and not otherwise protected by the 
efforts of larger creditors . In practice, nonadjusting 
creditors can often ride on the coattails of more active 
creditors.  A nonadjusting creditor that is in the s ame class 
as larger creditors will generally receive the same recovery, 
for instance.94 Moreover, the existence of secondary 
proceedings in the nonadjusting creditor's Member State 
should further diminish any risk of expropriation. 
The treatment of employees may seem to be an 
exception to this sanguine conclusion. This is the aspect of 
European insolvency regulation that varies most 
dramatically, with a few countries (like England) providing 
for very little protection for employees in bankruptcy, 
whereas others provide much more . The concern here is 
that a country's insolvency laws may reflect a strong 
national policy of protecting employees that will b e  
undermined if companies with local operations can domicile 
elsewhere . Even with this concern, however, there is less 
than initially meets the eye . If the country applied a 
consistent employment obligation, such _ as restrictions on 
laying off employees, to all business operations within the 
country, it would presumably be honored so long as the 
obligation were not limited to company or insolvency law. 
To the extent regulatory arbitrage encouraged lawmakers 
to adopt generally applicable laws rather than protections 
that only applied in bankruptcy, this effect could actually 
improve existing regulation. 
It is also important to emphasize the relatively limited 
scope of regulatory competition . In the U.S. ,  where there 
are few obstacles to incorporating in one state rather than 
another,  the vast majority of companies incorporate in their 
local jurisdiction. O nly large corporations seriously consider 
incorporating elsewhere , usually Delaware . 95 A similar 
94. It also is worth noting that tort claims, a major class of nonadjusting 
creditors in the U.S., are a much smaller factor in Europe. 
95. See, e.g. , Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, Vigorous Competition 
or Leisurely Walk: Reconsidering the Competition Over Corporate Charters, 112 
YALE L.J. 553 (2002) (documenting that the choice for incorporation is Delaware 
or a company's home state) ; Robert Daines, The Incorporation Choices of IPO 
Firms, 77 N.YU L.  REV. 1559 (2 002) (again documenting that the choice for 
incorporation is Delaware or a company's home state). 
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pattern seems likely to develop in Europe.  Some companies, 
for whom their home jurisdiction's company laws are 
seriously inefficient, may incorporate elsewhere . But the 
vast majority of companies can be expected to stay right 
where they are .96 
One final issue also warrants mention. In the U .S . ,  
differential tax rules play a relatively small role In 
corporations' choice of corporate domicile, and little or no 
role in their choice of bankruptcy venue . Federal tax rates 
are the same, whether a company incorporates in Delaware, 
New York, or Nevada.97 In Europe, by contrast, tax 
competition figures more prominently, due to significant 
differences in corporate tax rates. As a result , tax 
competition may influence corporations' choice of domicile 
at least as much as, and possibly more than, differences in 
corporate regulation. Existing tax rules also serve as a drag 
on charter competition by penalizing companies that 
change their domicile midstream. Whether these tax effects 
will continue as lawmakers in countries who are losing 
corporations respond to the tax competition, and as the tax 
rules that chill reincorporation are challenged under ED 
law as interfering with freedom of establishment, remains 
to be seen.98 
Either way, the underlying point about corporate and 
insolvency law remains the same. The current framework, 
which gives companies increasing flexibility to choose the 
96. This is a major theme of Enriques and Gelter, supra note 58. See also 
Luca Enriques, EC Company Law and the Fears of a European Delaware, 2004 
EUR. Bus. L. REV. 1259, 1265 (noting that cultural and political factors may 
impede reincorporations in the ED) . Enriques and Gelter also argue that 
Member States do not have a large incentive to compete to attract companies 
because the potential benefits for any given Member State are comparatively 
small. 
97. Even in the U . S . ,  differential tax rules do come into play for a few 
companies. The fact that Delaware does not impose a state tax on passive 
income, for instance, attracts some companies (particularly subsidiaries of a 
corporate group) to Delaware. Local tax effects also may influence non-U.S.  
companies' decisions whether or when to incorporate in the U.S. For a 
discussion of the greater significance of tax effects for incorporation decisions in 
Europe than in the U . S . ,  see Edward B. Rock, Taxes and Charter Competition 
(2005) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) . 
98. For an argument that the tax impediments to reincorporation may be 
struck down as interfering with freedom of establishment, see Armour, supra 
note 4, at 15- 1 6  . 
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company laws that apply to them, but offers less flexibility 
with respect to insolvency, appears to be a step in the right 
direction for EU corporate and insolvency regulation. But 
the mismatch between corporate and insolvency law could 
create undesirable distortions .  These distortions would be 
removed if a company's choice of domicile determined both 
the corporate and insolvency regulation that governed the 
company . 
This solution is directly contrary to the approach 
LoPucki advocates in Courting Failure, which decries the 
new regulatory competition in Europe and suggests that it 
should be shut down. Our analysis of the American data 
suggests that what LoPucki has condemned as problems 
actually appear to be solutions . Regulatory competition has 
had beneficial effects in the U.S .  Although competition in 
the European Union is likely to play out differently than its 
U.S .  analogue, the U.S .  evidence suggests that competition 
in the EU should be encouraged, not thwarted. 
